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Abstract: Both the academic literature and the policy debate on systematic
bailout guarantees and Government subsidies have ignored an important effect:
in industries where firms may go out of business due to idiosyncratic shocks,
Governments may increase the likelihood of (tacit) coordination if they set up
schemes that rescue failing firms. In a repeated-game setting, we show that a
systematic bailout regime increases the expected profits from coordination and
simultaneously raises the probability that competitors will remain in business
and will thus be able to “punish” firms that deviate from coordinated behaviour.
These effects make tacit coordination easier to sustain and have a detrimental
impact on welfare. While the key insight holds across any industry, we study
this question with an application to the banking sector, in light of the recent
financial crisis and the extensive use of bailout schemes.
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1 Introduction and motivation
The financial crisis and its aftermath have been affecting the global economy
since 2007. This has involved the bankruptcies of a large number of global firms,
including major financial institutions. State intervention in the form of bailouts
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has been playing a major role, with Governments rushing to rescue not only a
large fraction of their financial industries but also other major industries like the
automotive one. The banking sector has recently appeared to enjoy some degree
of explicit bailout guarantees for systemic financial institutions that were
deemed to be “too-big-to-fail”.1
Research studying the economic effects of bailouts has focused on firms’
unilateral incentives, as opposed to their coordinated behaviour. Arguments
against Government intervention typically revolve around the distortion of the
competitive process and the moral hazard issue: if firms expect that the
Government will intervene to help them in case of failure (or in adverse circum-
stances more generally), these may have the incentive to take excessive risks.2
On the other hand, arguments in favour of intervention range from distributional
considerations to the potential resolution of existing market failures.3
In this article, by contrast, we focus on the effect of bailouts on the incentives
to engage in coordinated behaviour. In particular, we develop a simple (infinite-
horizon) model that shows that a Government policy aimed at systematically
bailing out firms in the presence of negative idiosyncratic shocks facilitates (tacit)
coordination. To our knowledge, this result had not been previously identified.
Think of an oligopolistic industry where firms may receive random idiosyn-
cratic shocks that would force them out of business, absent Government inter-
vention. Now consider a Government policy that systematically bails out any
firm that has been subject to such a shock. This policy would make tacit
coordination easier to sustain in such industry because of two effects that
work in the same direction.
First, the net present value of tacit coordination is higher if a firm knows it
will stay in business forever: with systematic bailouts, a firm knows that it will
earn a share of industry profits in the future for sure; absent intervention, after
receiving a negative shock, it would go out of business and no longer earn any
1 Apart from the fiscal burden imposed, bailouts and Government subsidies entail some thorny
legal considerations, especially in the European Union (EU), where Article 107 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU defines and sets restrictions on “State aid” measures (or Government
subsidies) that confer, through public resources, economic advantages to selected entities,
affecting trade between EU Member States.
2 Beck et al. (2010) discuss in a policy report state-supported schemes for financial institutions
and their implications for competition, as well as European competition policy.
3 In the financial sector, for example, intervention (including that of a Central Bank) is often
justified on the grounds of preserving the stability of the financial system. Bankruptcies of
individual banks may trigger contagion effects across the sector (through the interbank and
asset markets) and may also harm consumers directly through the loss of private deposits
(subject to national deposit insurance schemes).
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profit from that point on. Second, the consequences from deviating from a tacit
coordination path are harsher in a scenario with systematic bailouts: absent
such bailouts, a firm that has deviated may be “lucky” and face no punishment
from its competitors in future periods because (with some probability) such
competitors may have received a negative shock and may not be in business
at the point when the punishment would take place; such a scenario could not
occur in the presence of systematic bailouts, that is, competitors would be in
business and would carry out the punishment strategy, according to a standard
supergame framework.4
We study this problem through an application to the banking sector, as it
has recently received much attention due to large bailouts. However, we also
show that the model and its implications are general and can be relevant to
many industries. Several industry features are sometimes thought to potentially
facilitate coordination, such as stable demand, homogeneous products, limited
innovation, symmetric cost structures and market transparency.5 Whether the
banking industry actually meets these criteria is an empirical question. Our main
insight is that keeping all factors equal, a commitment to bail firms out may
facilitate tacit coordination.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 briefly considers the relevant literature.
Section 3 presents the main model. Section 4 shows and discusses the results,
including the implications for welfare. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the
results, after relaxing some of the assumptions made in the main model. Section
6 concludes and offers some possible extensions.
2 Related literature
There is not a vast literature on the competitive effects of bailout guarantees or
on the economics of State aid as such, somewhat in contrast to the richness of
4 The results from our main analysis rely on the provision of systematic bailouts. A bailout for
systemically important institutions was not always guaranteed in the past. For example, while
Bear Stearns received a bailout, Lehman Brothers had to file for bankruptcy in 2008. However,
after the Lehman Brothers experience policy-makers became highly reluctant to let a systemi-
cally important bank fail. Symptomatically, the European Commission has departed from their
principle of “one-time-last-time” aid a number of times (especially so in the latest financial
crisis) where ex post this would have been detrimental for the economy (see European
Commission (2004) for the principle and European Commission (2008, 2009) for its relaxation).
In Section 5, in any event, we show that our results remain valid in the presence of a stochastic
bailout regime (i.e. where firms are bailed out only with some probability).
5 A clear exposition of the economics of tacit coordination can be found in Ivaldi et al. (2003).
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the literature on subsidies and trade.6 Bailout guarantees and Government
subsidies are criticised by economists, as they may lead to a variety of ineffi-
ciencies. In the financial sector, bailout guarantees are sometimes believed to
lead to excessive risk-taking and over-investment due to moral hazard problems.
Trading off the costs and benefits of financial sector bailouts is complex (see
Gale and Vives (2002) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2004)). However, ex post
bailouts may sometimes be justified in the interest of financial stability.
In relation to Government subsidies and their competitive effects more
generally, Besley et al. (1999) discuss two broad classes: externalities arising
from aid (strategic trade policy, tax competition and economic geography con-
siderations) and inefficient competition between Governments. Dewatripont and
Seabright (2006) go beyond intergovernmental issues and build a model where
local politicians invest in wasteful projects purely to show their diligence and
win votes. Collie (2000) instead proposes an economic explanation of why
individual States may have an incentive to subsidise firms with the aim of
reducing oligopolistic distortions. He shows that a multilateral institution
responsible for prohibiting subsidies can increase welfare.
Friedriszick, Roeller, and Verouden (2008) review the efficiency rationales
for aid (tackling market failures such as externalities, public goods, asymmetric
information and lack of coordination) as well as equity considerations. They also
point towards cross-border (positive) externalities in the case of EU State aid.
Their paper then highlights the potential costs of State aid (beyond the direct
cost of intervention) such as anti-competitive effects, “picking wrong winners”
and international spillover effects. Among the potential distortions of competi-
tion, they list the support of inefficient production; the distortion of dynamic
(inter-temporal) incentives; the potential increase in market power; and the
distortion of production and location decisions across EU countries. Finally,
they propose an actual effects-based framework to assess whether particular
State aid measures should be approved. Martin and Valbonesi (2008) develop a
model of the impact of State aid on market structure and performance in an
integrating market (i.e. a common market with increasing trade flows) and find
that in equilibrium Governments grant State aid, reducing common market
welfare. However, they do not consider tacit coordination.
Hainz and Hakenes (2012) compare the efficiency properties of five options
to grant State aid to firms (some of which would also feed through to the
banking system). The most efficient option is shown to depend on the tax
6 An extensive review of the role and the effects of State aid can be found in Nitsche and
Heidhues (2006). For an equally policy-oriented approach based on economic theory, the reader
is also directed to OFT (2004), Buelens et al. (2007) and Spector (2009).
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distortion and the informational cost needed to select the “good” firms. Finally,
recent unpublished work by Schinkel and Randag (2012) suggests that tacit
coordination may play a role in the banking industry. Schinkel and Randag
consider the Dutch mortgage market after State aid was granted to several Dutch
commercial banks in 2009. They observe a substantial increase in Dutch mort-
gage rates against a downward trend of mortgage rates in Europe. The authors
argue that coordinated behaviour in the Dutch mortgage market was facilitated
because the European Commission imposed price leadership bans on the
affected banks as part of their restructuring conditions.7
Instead, our model focuses on the effects of bailout guarantees on the
incentives of firms to coordinate their behaviour. In the case of banking, it
may be beneficial to sacrifice some level of competition in the interest of
financial stability.8 However, this relationship is rather complex and both
empirical and theoretical results are far from being clear-cut.9,10 This debate is
nevertheless beyond the scope of our paper, since we only take banking as an
example and our model is not sector-specific.
In industrial economics, models of tacit coordination have been applied
extensively, but not in the context of systematic bailout guarantees. Our model
adopts the standard framework of tacit coordination for repeated oligopoly
interaction (originally due to Stigler (1964)).
7 The effect of price leadership on the viability of coordination, however, is debated in the
theoretical literature (see Mouraviev and Rey (2011) who show that price leadership can facil-
itate coordination).
8 See Carletti (2008) for an excellent survey on this trade-off.
9 Keeley (1990) was the first one to find a positive empirical relationship between more
competition and more risk-taking but later studies came to mixed or even opposite results.
The earlier theoretical literature mostly gave rationales for Keeley’s findings but also discussed
why the opposite may be the case (most prominently Boyd and De Nicoló (2005)). For a
theoretical discussion see Allen and Gale (2004). A more recent extensive review is given by
Vives (2010).
10 Perotti and Suarez (2002) investigate the impact of competition on banks’ portfolio risk
choices. In particular, they examine the relationship between the optimal portfolio risk and
banking regulation (merger policy and market entry regulation) in an oligopoly context. The
main mechanism in their model is the strategic substitutability between portfolio decisions of
duopolistic banks. In particular, a given duopolist has an incentive to invest in the prudent
asset if the competitor chooses a risky strategy (since she can expect large monopoly rents if the
competitor fails).
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3 Model
In this paper we develop a model on the relationship between systematic bailout
guarantees and tacit coordination. Given the particular amount of attention
received by the financial sector in relation to bailout schemes following the
onset of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, our paper offers an application to the
banking industry (Section 5.3 shows that the results can be easily transposed to
any industry).
The basic building block of our model is Freixas and Rochet’s (2008) extension
of the Klein–Monti model to Cournot oligopoly. The original monopolistic model
features a single bank facing an upward-sloping demand for deposits and a down-
ward-sloping demand for loans (as developed by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972)).
To shed light on the impact of systematic bailout guarantees on tacit
coordination and consumer welfare, our model makes some simplifications
with respect to Freixas and Rochet (2008). In our model, the banking industry
is characterised by a duopoly competing in the deposit market over an infinite
horizon. We consider discrete time. Production (management) costs are normal-
ised to nil. Banks simultaneously set interest rates r1 and r2; where r1; r2 > 0. The
(linear) demand function is given by:
Qðr1; r2Þ ¼ min Q;max r1; r2f g
 
; ½1
where Q > 0 is an upper bound on the demand. There is a single asset (project)
in which a bank invests its funds. The return to the asset is stochastic. It is
subject to the following idiosyncratic shock: it yields net return RH (with prob-
ability p) and RL (with probability 1 p).11 We assume that RH <Q (this condi-
tion ensures that the upper bound on the demand never binds, which simplifies
the analysis without qualitatively affecting our main results). For simplicity, and
without loss of generality, we normalise RL to –1. This means that all funds are
lost in the presence of a negative shock and nothing is returned to depositors.
Banks have discount factor 0< δ< 1 and the time line of our game, for each
period t 2 ½1;1Þ, is given in Figure 1. Discount factors can be justified by a
positive market interest rate that discounts future payoffs or by a time preference
for early payments.12
11 In another industry one could argue that firms can be hit with a certain probability in each period
by a cost shock or a shock on their production technology that forces them to leave the market.
12 In industrial economics discount factors over infinite-horizon games are often interpreted as
the probability that the game will actually be played in a given period, so as to implicitly relax
the infinite-horizon interpretation. Note that this is different from the adverse shocks that we
introduce (with probability 1 p) as these are idiosyncratic.
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Every period, bank i ¼ 1; 2 maximises profits ðRi  riÞ  Qðri; rjÞ
 
by choosing ri,
taking into account the possibility of tacitly coordinating behaviour for high
enough discount factors (as in Stigler (1964)).13 We assume that the market
(deposits and profits) is equally shared by the banks when they set the same
interest rate. Importantly, when a bank receives a negative shock (RL), it is
forced out of the market (as in Perotti and Suarez (2002)). It goes bankrupt
because it cannot repay depositors and its authorisation to operate is not
renewed. We make the following assumption:
Condition 1 RH > 4
1 p
p
:
This condition is necessary to ensure positive levels of consumer welfare.14
Banks will set interest rates only taking the good state of the world (RH ) into
account. Let us adopt the superscript M for monopoly (or coordination) and C for
competition and denote profits by π. If a bank is alone in the market, profit
maximisation leads to rM ¼ RH=2, QðrMÞ ¼ RH=2 and πM ¼ RH=2ð Þ2. Competition,
by contrast, leads to rC ¼ RH , and QðrCÞ ¼ RH and πC ¼ 0: Let us define
WM ¼ 12 RH=2ð Þ2 as the consumer surplus (or welfare) at the monopoly price
level and WC ¼ R2H=2 as the consumer surplus under competition.
Another element of our model is a national deposit insurance scheme
(NDIS), covering 100% of deposits. That is, when a bank goes bankrupt, deposi-
tors are returned their initial investments in full (but without interest). The NDIS
Time
At each time t:
r1, r2 are set (common 
knowledge) 
Consumers choose 
their bank
Shocks realize RH (p) 
and RL (1–p) (c. k.)
Banks stay (pay 
gross interest) or exit 
(c. k.) 
Individuals receive capital plus 
interest and consume it (p) or 
lose everything (1–p) 
Banks consume their profits 
Figure 1: Time line
13 In general the game has multiple equilibria but we restrict ourselves to the best equilibrium
in terms of profit maximisation, i.e. banks coordinate their behaviour for sufficiently high
values of δ and both charge the monopoly interest rate.
14 Under reasonable parameter assumptions we have RH > 4
ð1pÞ
p , e.g. for p ¼ 0:9 and
RH ¼ 0:6 we have 0:6 > 0:4 (recall RL ¼ 1, so RH ¼ 0:6 is not particularly high).
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is funded by flat-rate taxes. We use the subscript “C” for coordination and “NC”
for “no coordination”. The ex post loss that has to be covered by the insurance
scheme is ΦC1 ¼ RH=4 whenever one duopolist bank (which was tacitly coor-
dinating with the other bank) fails; ΦC2 ¼ RH=2 whenever a monopolist bank
fails or both banks in a duopoly with tacit coordination fail; ΦNC1 ¼ RH=2
whenever banks compete and one receives a negative shock; ΦNC2 ¼ RH when-
ever banks compete and both receive a negative shock.
We assume the existence of a NDIS for three reasons. First, it reflects
common practice in the banking sector across countries. Second, it enables us
to isolate the effect of systematic bailout guarantees on collective competitive
behaviour when we compare consumer welfare under a regime of systematic
bailouts to that under a regime of no systematic bailouts (that is, we can focus on
the welfare effects due to different levels of interest rates arising from different
competitive conditions, as opposed to whether depositors get their initial invest-
ments back). This follows from the fact that depositors get their deposits fully
refunded under both regimes whenever a bank fails, while the financing of the
scheme is done by a non-distortionary tax in both regimes. Third, introducing
NDIS (which adds and subtracts the same amount from a welfare perspective)
makes our model readily comparable to applications to other industries where
the failure of a firm does not cause an immediate loss in wealth to its customers.
Figure 2 summarises, graphically, the above discussion. Notice that as the
demand schedule is upward-sloping, the various areas in the graph (profit π, con-
sumer surplus anddeadweight loss, or DWL) are inverted (horizontally) with respect
Consumer 
surplus
Q
r
0
r M = RH /2
Q (r )
Q
DWL
r C = RH 
Q(r M ) = RH /2
RL = −1
C2
Figure 2: A simple model of demand for deposits
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to a traditional diagrammatic analysis of linear demands. For simplicity, we have
only depicted the potential loss from bankruptcy (ΦC2) in the case of monopoly.15
In our model, systematic bailout guarantees (which are financed through
lump-sum taxes) operate as follows. First, the Government renews the bank’s
authorisation to operate even when the bank has gone bankrupt. Second, the
Government incurs a sunk cost γ per bailout. We do not explicitly model how
this cost arises but it could be justified, for instance, as the cost of resources
devoted by the financial regulator to examine the books of a failing bank and
facilitate its rescue. In a non-banking industry this cost could arise through
restructuring. Notice that we do not impose any assumption on γ. Instead, in
Section 4.2, we determine upper bounds on its value such that a systematic
bailout policy is welfare-enhancing to consumers.16
Policy-makers may want to commit to a “one-time-last-time” approach to bail-
outs or rescue (or restructuring) aid. But in practice there have been several excep-
tions to this rule, most notably during the financial crisis.17 Moreover, in the financial
industry policy-makers often fear potentially strong negative externalities in the
short-run (contagion effects, adverse impact on the real economy) if they do not
grant bailouts to an insolvent (or illiquid) bank. For this reason policy-makers
consider bailouts as being necessary ex post.18 Consequently banks that are highly
interconnected or “too-big-to-fail” can expect to be bailed out because policy-makers
face a time-inconsistency problem. They can hardlymake a credible commitment not
to bail banks out. We therefore think that our approximation of a systematic bailout
regime is adequate for this type of implicit or explicit guarantees in the financial
sector.19 However, it can be argued that systemic bailout guarantees are also present
in other industries such as the automotive or the airline industries.
15 Notice the analogy to a model of duopolistic competition in a non-banking industry with a
downward-sloping demand curve (see also Section 5.3 for a detailed discussion of the applic-
ability to other industries).
16 As noted earlier, the assumption of a 100% deposit insurance allows us to isolate the effect of
systematic bailout guarantees. In practice, typically less than 100% of deposits are insured.
Nevertheless, we rarely observe any losses by unsecured creditors of banks. In other words,
bailouts are the norm and bail-ins are the exception. Hence, unsecured creditors enjoy an implicit
insurance provided by systematic bailout guarantees. In this vein, we interpret systematic bailout
guarantees in our model not as a pure rescue of a failing bank, but as a genuine bailout.
17 See for instance European Commission (2009).
18 See also Gale and Vives (2002) and Lyons (2009) for a discussion of this issue.
19 The existence of implicit guarantees is of course hard to prove empirically. Nevertheless
there is some indirect evidence. For example, rating agencies publish “external support” ratings
which reflect their expectations on the likelihood of a bailout. See Gropp, Hakenes and
Schnabel (2011) for a paper that uses these data to estimate how bank risk-taking behaviour
is affected by the presence of a guarantee.
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Throughout the paper we focus on the minimal discount factor for which
coordination can be sustained and assume that under coordination banks max-
imise joint profits and share them equally, i.e. banks set the monopoly interest
rate. However, we acknowledge that other equilibria (including the competitive
equilibrium) always exist. Furthermore, we posit a regime under tacit coordina-
tion in which firms adopt a simple trigger strategy by setting the profit-max-
imising interest rate as long as no competitor deviates and reverting to the
competitive interest rate (forever) as soon as one bank has defected from the
(tacitly) coordinated strategy. In Section 5 we show that our key insight is robust
to a relaxation of this assumption.
4 Results
In this section we first demonstrate that the introduction of systematic bailout
guarantees decreases the minimal discount factor for which tacit coordination is
viable. This implies that there is a range of values of the discount factor for which
the implementation of systematic bailout guarantees can cause a change from a
competitive outcome to one with tacit coordination. Second, we examine the
welfare implications of this result. We demonstrate that for such range of values
of the discount factor, systematic bailout guarantees, by generating tacit coordi-
nation, can thus lower consumer welfare as long as the probability of an adverse
shock ð1 pÞ is not too high, while they have a positive effect for all other values
of the discount factor if the intrinsic cost of bailouts (γ) is not too high.
4.1 Systematic bailout guarantees and incentive to coordinate
The first step is to derive the critical discount factors above which tacit coordi-
nation is sustainable under each policy regime.
In the absence of systematic bailout guarantees, the incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC) for tacit coordination – which we fully derive in Appendix A.1 –
is as follows:20
20 Absent systematic bailout guarantees, the profits under tacit coordination need to embed
the probability that a bank becomes a monopolist at some point over an infinite horizon
(whenever its competitor receives a negative shock) as well as the probability that such bank
itself goes bankrupt at some point. The profits in the period of deviation also need to account
for the probability that the deviating bank itself goes bankrupt in that period, since the shock
occurs after market conduct is chosen. Likewise, punishment profits need to account for the
10 C. Bertsch et al.
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X1
t¼1
δt1 p2t1
πM
2
þ ptð1 pt1ÞπM
 zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{Present value of expected profits under coordination
½2
 pπM|{z}
Expected instantaneous profit from deviating
þ
X1
t¼2
δt1 p2t1πC þ ptð1 pt1ÞπM |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Present value of expected profit under punishment
:
From here onwards, we use the superscripts “NB” for “no bailouts” and “B” for
“bailouts”. Noting that πC ¼ 0, tacit coordination can be sustained for all
δ  δNB ¼ 12p2, where δNB  1 requires p  p ¼ 1ﬃﬃ2p .
In the presence of systematic bailout guarantees, by contrast, a bank that has
encountered a negative shock is bailed out at no cost to it. There is no profit (nor
loss) in the period of failure. Noting once again that the competitive profit is zero
(πC ¼ 0) every period, the relevant ICC reads
X1
t¼1
δt1 p
πM
2
þ ð1 pÞ  0
 
 pπM þ
X1
t¼2
δt1ðpπC þ ð1 pÞ  0Þ: ½3
That is, tacit coordination can be sustained for all δ  δB ¼ 12. This is the tradi-
tional result obtained in a supergame where symmetric duopolists engage in
price competition. The only difference is that both the profit from coordinated
behaviour and the deviation profit have to be scaled by the probability p of
receiving a positive shock.
Proposition 1 Systematic bailout guarantees and incentive to coordinate
In the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, a policy of systematic bailout guarantees
that keeps banks (firms) in business after a shock facilitates tacit coordination; that
is, tacit coordination can be sustained for lower values of discount factors.
Proof. Note simply that 12 ¼ δB < δNB ¼ 12p2 ; " p< 1. ■
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of this result. When banks place
little value on the future (left half of the chart) tacit coordination cannot be
sustained, regardless of whether there are systematic bailout guarantees. When
banks care much about the future for a given likelihood of a positive shock
possibility that the deviating bank will actually be a monopolist for some time, as well as the
possibility that the deviating firm goes out of business.
Systematic Bailout Guarantees and Tacit Coordination 11
Brought to you by | University of East Anglia
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/17 3:56 PM
(δ  δNB, i.e. the area at the top-right corner) tacit coordination can be sustained
in either regime. Finally, for intermediate values of the discount factor
(12  δ< δNB, i.e. the bottom-right area) only the competitive outcome is sustain-
able in the absence of a systematic bailout policy, while tacit coordination is
made possible by a systematic bailout policy.
The intuition for the mechanism at work in the bottom-right area (i.e. the
reason for the change in the critical discount factor between the two regimes) is
straightforward. In our model, a systematic bailout regime has two main effects on
a bank (or firm), both working in the same direction. First, such a policy increases
the present value of future profits under coordination. Banks know they will
receive a share of monopoly profits forever: it can no longer be the case that
they “miss out” because an adverse shock sends them out of business. Second,
absent a systematic bailout regime a bank may have an incentive to deviate from
the coordinated strategy in order to raise short-term profits in the hope that its
competitor will (exogenously) go bankrupt and thus be unable to punish the
deviant bank in future periods. But such an incentive would no longer exist in a
regime where failing banks are systematically bailed out. Both effects make
coordination more attractive than competition for banks (firms), all else equal.
4.2 Welfare impact of systematic bailout guarantees
In this section we perform a comparison of consumer welfare levels under the
two regimes considered (systematic bailout guarantees and no systematic
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
p 
Competition in 
both regimes 
Coordination 
in both regimes 
Competition without 
systematic bailouts 
BUT 
Coordination with 
systematic bailouts 
No bailouts 
Bailouts 
δ
Figure 3: Probability of positive shock and critical discount factor
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bailout guarantees).21 First, in Section 4.2.1, we compute the consumer welfare
levels absent a systematic bailout guarantee (with and without coordination).
Second, in Section 4.2.2, we do likewise, but in the presence of a systematic
bailout regime. Third, in Section 4.2.3, we present our findings in Proposition 2
and provide a discussion.
Our key result is straightforward: if the introduction of a bailout regime does
not make an industry switch from a competitive outcome to a coordinated one
(either because the discount factor was “too low”, so it remains competitive, or
because it was “too high”, so there was already coordinated behaviour), such a
policy enhances consumer welfare, provided the exogenous bailout costs are not
too high. This is because consumers (depositors) will benefit from the continued
existence of the industry (as opposed to the banks going bankrupt, at some
point). By contrast, for the intermediate range of discount factors identified in
the previous section, whereby a systematic bailout regime triggers the incentive
for competitive banks to coordinate, such a policy is detrimental for welfare as
long as the probability of a negative shock is not too high.
In this section we focus on consumer welfare, as opposed to total welfare.
We do so because consumer welfare is the standard typically used by competi-
tion authorities in their investigations and in policy-making. Furthermore, in a
context with tacit coordination it may be controversial, from a public policy
perspective, to include, as part of a welfare measure, the super-normal profits
earned. In an extension in Section 5.3, we show that while our intuition was
applied to a banking model, it holds in fact for a much more general industry
setting with a downward-sloping demand curve. As part of that extension, we
also show that a policy that guarantees systematic bailouts is also detrimental
for total welfare as long as the probability of a negative shock is not too high.
4.2.1 No systematic bailout guarantees
Under coordination (δ  12p2): consumer welfare needs to be computed as the
weighted average of consumer welfare levels under different scenarios (e.g.
duopolistic coordination and monopoly, considering all the possible combina-
tions of events, i.e. positive and negative shocks), where the weights are the
probabilities under which each scenario occurs. We provide a full derivation in
21 In Spector (2009; section 7.4.3) there was also a brief, informal, recognition of the trade-off
between benefits consumers may derive from the continuation of a firm’s business and the need
to raise tax revenues, as part of an assessment of the welfare implications of rescue or
restructuring aid.
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Appendix A.2. Present discounted (expected) consumer welfare (under a high
enough discount factor to sustain tacit coordination) in the absence of bailout
guarantees is given by:
EðWNBC Þ ¼
RH ð1 pÞ  p4RH
 
2 1 δp2ð Þ þ
RH
p
2 RH  2ð1 pÞ
 
2 1 δpð Þ ; ½4
where subscript “C” stands for “coordination”. Note that Condition 1 ensures
positive consumer welfare levels.22
Under no coordination (δ< 12p2): in this case, due to the lower discount
factor, there is no tacit coordination by construction, and there can only be
either a monopoly (if the competitor has received a negative shock) or a compe-
titive duopoly. In either case, one needs to account for the possibility that
positive or negative shocks have occurred. The present discounted (expected)
consumer welfare in the absence of bailouts, under a low enough discount factor
to guarantee competition,23 is given by:24
EðWNBNC Þ ¼
p RHð Þ2
4 1 δp2ð Þ þ
RH
p
2 RH  2ð1 pÞ
 
2 1 δpð Þ ; ½5
where subscript “NC” stands for “no coordination”.
4.2.2 Systematic bailout guarantees
We proceed in the same fashion as in Section 4.2.1. However, here, banks never
exit from the market, as they are bailed out whenever they are hit by a negative
shock. When consumers’ deposits are lost due to the negative shocks, the
Government refunds them the original capital, as well as incurring the bailout
costs γ. To close the model, we compute the total expected stream of bailout costs
and set up a corresponding lump-sum tax (which includes the financing of both
the NDIS and the direct bailout costs γ) on consumers, thus reducing their welfare.
22 To see this notice that the terms in brackets are negative since RH > 4
ð1pÞ
p . Further
RH=2
1δp2 <
RH=2
1δp whenever p< 1. Eventually for expected welfare to be positive we need to have
RH=2
1δp2 ½ð1 pÞ  p4RH  >  RH=21δp ½p2 RH  2ð1 pÞ, which holds since 1 δp< 2ð1 δp2Þ.
23 Of course competition takes place so long as both banks are in business. If only one remains
in business, it is assumed to behave monopolistically until it is hit by a negative shock and thus
forced out of the market.
24 See Appendix A.2 for the derivation. Again, Condition 1 ensures positive consumer welfare
levels.
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Under coordination (δ  12): in the presence of systematic bailout guaran-
tees, the present discounted (expected) consumer welfare under a high enough
discount factor to sustain tacit coordination is
EðWBC Þ ¼
RH
p
4RH  ð1 pÞ
 
2 1 δð Þ 
2ð1 pÞγ
1 δ : ½6
Under no coordination (δ< 12): in the presence of bailouts, the present dis-
counted (expected) consumer welfare under a discount factor low enough to
guarantee competition is
EðWBNCÞ ¼
RH pRH  ð1 pÞð Þ
2 1 δð Þ 
2ð1 pÞγ
1 δ : ½7
4.2.3 Welfare results and discussion
Proposition 2 summarises the results on the welfare effects of systematic bailout
guarantees.
Proposition 2 Systematic bailout guarantees and consumer welfare
(i) In the range of discount factors such that there is competition in absence of
systematic bailout guarantees but tacit coordination with systematic bailout
guarantees, such a policy reduces present discounted (expected) consumer
welfare if the probability of a positive shock is sufficiently high ðp  2ﬃﬃ
7
p Þ.
That is, EðWBC Þ<EðWNBNC Þ; " 12  δ< 12p2. This is true even in the absence of
direct bailout costs.
(ii) In an environment where duopolistic banks (firms) compete regardless of
whether there are systematic bailout guarantees (δ< 12), such a policy
reduces present discounted (expected) consumer welfare if and only if the
direct costs of bailing out a bank (firm) exceed γ^C.
(iii) In an environment where duopolistic banks (firms) can sustain tacit coordi-
nation regardless of whether there are systematic bailout guarantees
(δ  12p2), such a policy reduces present discounted (expected) consumer
welfare if and only if the direct costs of bailing out a bank (firm) exceed γ^NC.
Proof. The proof of (i) is in Appendix A.4. To see why (ii) and (iii) hold, we
compute the upper limits on γ such that the present discounted (expected)
consumer welfare under systematic bailout guarantees is larger than under no
systematic bailout guarantees, in the cases where public intervention does not
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affect the competitive state of the industry. Call γ^NC this limit value of γ for the
case of no coordination in both policy regimes, i.e. for δ< 12:
EðWBNCÞ  EðWNBNC Þ ,
γ  γ^NC ¼ 1 δ2ð1 pÞ
RH pRH  2ð1 pÞð Þ
2 1 δð Þ  EðW
NB
NC Þ
  ½8
In Appendix A.3 we show that γ^NC  0. Next we compute the upper limit γ^C
corresponding to the case of coordination in both regimes, i.e. for δ  12p2:
EðWBC Þ  EðWNBC Þ ,
γ  γ^C ¼
1 δ
2ð1 pÞ
RH
p
4RH  ð1 pÞ
 
2 1 δð Þ  EðW
NB
C Þ
  ½9
Again we show in Appendix A.3 that γ^C  0. ■
Proposition 2 introduces a simple dichotomy between two scenarios that sum-
marises the effect of systematic bailout guarantees on consumer welfare. In one
scenario (capturing both cases ii and iii above), systematic bailout guarantees do
not influence the competitive state of the industry and are therefore welfare-
improving as long as their intrinsic cost is not too large. Indeed, in such a case,
the only effect of systematic bailout guarantees is to preserve the very existence of
the market, which is beneficial to both firms and consumers. In the other scenario
(case i), where systematic bailout guarantees affect the competitive state of the
industry by triggering coordination, we find that its overall effect on consumer
welfare is guaranteed to be negative if the probability of a positive shock is
sufficiently high. A sufficient condition is given by p  2ﬃﬃ
7
p  0:76 > p  0:71.25
This means that in such a scenario, the adverse coordination-facilitating effect of
bailouts dominates its beneficial market-preserving effect. The dominance of the
first force over the second force does not appear a priori self-evident. We attribute
this feature to the fact that this scenario corresponds to relatively low values of
the discount factor. For such values of the discount factor and as long as the
probability of failures 1 p is not too high, the adverse price effect of coordina-
tion thus dominates the long-run positive benefits related to the preservation of
the market.
25 Recall from Section 4.1 that p  p ¼ 1ﬃﬃ
2
p is required for δNB  1. The sufficient condition,
though more demanding than needed, is not very restrictive as it allows for relatively high
failure probabilities due to a negative shock.
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Figure 4 presents our main welfare result graphically (for simplicity, it abstracts
from the cost γ of bailing out a bank). The horizontal axis corresponds to the
discount factor δ, and the vertical axis measures present discounted (expected)
consumer welfare. Three relevant regions can be identified. In the left region
(δ< 12) banks compete with each other regardless of whether there are systematic
bailout guarantees. In the right region (δ  12p2) tacit coordination can be sus-
tained in either regime. However, in the central region, tacit coordination can
only be sustained in the presence of systematic bailout guarantees. In the left
and right regions, systematic bailout guarantees can be consumer welfare-
enhancing, and this depends on whether the vertical distance between the
broken and the solid line (for any given discount factor) exceeds the (expected
tax bill due to the) direct costs of bailing out banks γ. In the central region, by
contrast, systematic bailout guarantees decrease consumer welfare.
5 Discussion and robustness
Our main insights are robust to several important model variations. In Section 5.1
we demonstrate that the intermediate range of discount factors underlying the
results in Propositions 1 and 2 increases for important modifications of the model
(modified trigger strategies and interest rate under coordination). Next, Section 5.2
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Figure 4: Effect of a systematic bailout policy on consumer welfare, by discount factor
Systematic Bailout Guarantees and Tacit Coordination 17
Brought to you by | University of East Anglia
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/17 3:56 PM
analyses the robustness of the intermediate range of discount factors to several
other variations of the model, showing that the range continues to exist (though it
may decrease). Finally, in Section 5.3, we jointly demonstrate the applicability of
our model to a more general industry setting with a downward-sloping demand
curve, as well as the robustness of our key insight when considering total welfare
instead of consumer welfare by revisiting the results of Proposition 2.
5.1 Model variations where the intermediate range of discount
factors increases
The intermediate range of discount factors where our result arises is expanded in
the case of two variations of our model: when considering trigger strategies with
a finite punishment phase of T  1 periods and when relaxing the assumption
that the interest rate under tacit coordination is set at the monopolistic level.
Proposition 3 summarises such findings.
Proposition 3 Robustness of the existence of a range of discount factors under
which a systematic bailout regime generates an incentive to coordinate
The intermediate range of discount factors expands when: (i) the length T  1
of the punishment phase is reduced:
dðδNBðTÞ  δBðTÞÞ
dT
<0; ½10
or when (ii) the interest rate on deposits under tacit coordination is higher than the
monopoly interest rate, i.e. r ¼ rM þ ε where ε 2 ð0;
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð2p2  1ÞðRH2 Þ2
q
Þ:
dðδNBðεÞ  δBðεÞÞ
dε
> 0: ½11
Proof. See Appendix A.5. ■
Intuitively, coordination is harder to sustain when considering different trigger
strategies where the punishment phase is not infinite, but lasts for T  1 peri-
ods. As a result, the critical discount factor increases under both regimes.
However, δNB increases by more than δB and, hence, the intermediate range of
discount factors where our qualitative result persists increases. Instead, a relaxa-
tion of the assumption that the interest rate under tacit coordination is equal to
the monopolistic rate leads to a reduction of the present value of expected
profits under coordination and makes coordination harder to sustain. Again,
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the intermediate range of discount factors for which our result arises increases
(the upper bound on ε merely ensures that δNBðεÞ< 1).
5.2 Robustness of the existence of the intermediate range of
discount factors
In what follows, we consider three variations of our model and prove that while
the precise range of intermediate discount factors ½δB; δNB decreases, it is never
an empty set. Our qualitative result thus survives.
First, consider a variant of the model where the profit from coordinated
behaviour is asymmetrically shared. In this scenario coordination is only sus-
tainable if also the firm with the lower profit share from coordinated behaviour
does not have an incentive to deviate. Let f  12 be the fraction of profits from
coordinated behaviour going to the firm with the lower profit share, then
δB ¼ f < δNB ¼ fp2. If f decreases (firms become more asymmetric) and the inter-
mediate range of discount factors decreases:
dðδNBðf Þ  δBðf ÞÞ
df
> 0: ½12
Second, consider a variant of the model where bailouts are stochastic. Our
qualitative results continue to hold. The only difference is that the range of
discount factors where our result arises becomes narrower, because the regime
with bailouts becomes more similar to the regime without bailouts. Suppose that
banks are bailed out with probability 0  q  1 conditional on failing. Then
δBðqÞ ¼ 1
2ðpþð1pÞqÞ2 2 ½δ
B; δNB and:
dδBðqÞ
dq
<0: ½13
See Appendix A.6 for the derivations.
Third, consider relaxing the assumption that bailouts are unconditional. In
particular, assume that the bailout cost has to be financed by firms who have to
pay a fixed proportion of their future profits in order to be eligible for a bailout.
This leads to a reduction of the expected profits under coordination, while
expected profits in the punishment phase stay unaltered (assuming that firms
with zero profits cannot be taxed).26 As a result, with bailouts, coordination is
26 We are aware that such a policy rule could not work in practice or at least should not be
interpreted literally. If a policy-maker believed in this framework, knew the model parameters and
observed payment of the tax, she would deduce that firms have been coordinating their behaviour.
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now harder to sustain than before (i.e. δB increases). Still, as long as the bailout
cost γ is not too high our key insight prevails. Interestingly, bailout guarantees
can be re-interpreted as a market-based insurance mechanism. In other words,
firms may find it profitable to create an insurance fund that supports ailing firms
as long as the bailout costs are not too high. Our paper suggests that such
endogenous insurance arrangements can facilitate coordination.
5.3 Applicability to other industries and total
welfare standard
In this section we simultaneously discuss two results. First, we demonstrate the
applicability of our model to a more general industry setting with a downward-
sloping demand curve. Second, we show the robustness of our key insight when
considering total welfare instead of consumer welfare in the more general
industry setting.
In Section 3, we argued that the mechanism we describe can readily be
transposed to other industries where systematic Government intervention is
prevalent. In a non-banking industry, the idiosyncratic shocks to firms could
be negative shocks to their production technology that force them to leave the
market. A few differences arise with respect to the banking setup. First, the
computations are slightly altered because a non-financial firm can gain the full
market share in the period where the rival fails.27 Second, the welfare levels
associated with some of the events differ because of the absence of immediate
losses in wealth for consumers after a failure of a non-financial firm.
We discuss the following general industry setting. Consider a non-banking
industry with a duopoly, idiosyncratic shocks, zero marginal costs and a linear
downward-sloping demand that is the equivalent of Figure 2 (i.e. rotate the
demand curve in Figure 2 by 90° anti-clockwise, swap the DWL and the con-
sumer surplus areas, set the intercept to Q¼RH and replace r with p, rC ¼ RH
with pC ¼ 0, and rM¼RH=2 with pM¼RH=2). The result of Proposition 1 is unal-
tered. However, the result of Proposition 2 is modified. In particular, for the non-
banking industry case (i) of Proposition 2 changes. Let TW denote total welfare
and define p0 ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ3=5p  0:77 and p00  0:87.
27 This was not possible in the banking industry, where the deposits are collected at the
beginning of the period.
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Proposition 4 Systematic bailout guarantees in a non-banking industry and
total welfare
In the intermediate range of discount factors, systematic bailout guarantees
reduce:
(a) present discounted (expected) consumer welfare if the probability of a
positive shock is sufficiently high ðp  p0Þ. That is, EðWBC Þ<EðWNBNC Þ;
" 12  δ< 12p2.
(b) present discounted (expected) total welfare if the probability of a
positive shock is sufficiently high ðp  p00Þ. That is, EðTWBC Þ<EðTWNBNC Þ;
" 12  δ< 12p2.
This is true even in the absence of direct bailout costs.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.7. ■
Intuitively, we need that the probability of failure, 1 p, is not too high.
Otherwise, the adverse coordination-facilitating effect of bailouts is dominated
by its beneficial market-preserving effect. Different to our main analysis in
Section 4, the market-preserving effect is stronger in the total welfare analysis.
Now the market-preserving effect shows up not only as preserving future con-
sumer surplus but also as preserving future producer surplus in the event of
negative shocks to both firms. Hence, the sufficient condition on the lower
bound for the probability of a positive shock is more restrictive when consider-
ing total welfare.
6 Conclusion
The literature on Government subsidies and the related policy debate have
typically focused on the adverse efficiency effects of such policies (misallocation
of resources, moral hazard) and on countervailing arguments typically (though
not exclusively) based on social policy.
This paper has developed a simple infinite-horizon model that sheds light
on a result that to our knowledge had not been identified before: a Government
policy aimed at systematically bailing out firms in the presence of negative
idiosyncratic shocks facilitates (tacit) coordination. This is because expected
future profits from coordination increase (since firms are guaranteed to be in
business in future periods); and because the guaranteed presence of competitors
in the next periods makes the (expected) punishment phase harsher than in an
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environment where competitors may exit the market due to an exogenous shock
(which would leave the deviant firm unpunished).
Examining the implications of this result on the welfare effects of systematic
bailout guarantees, our main result is the identification of a range of discount
factors for which a systematic bailout policy is coordination-facilitating. In this
range coordination resulting from a systematic bailout policy is always detri-
mental for welfare. In the real world, though, this link would need to be
examined empirically and regulators, policy-makers and courts would have to
assess this on a case-by-case basis.
As shown in Section 5, the main mechanism can be generalised in several
ways and is robust to a number of alternative assumptions about the industry
environment and the Government policy chosen. This paper can set the stage for
interesting extensions. One possible direction is to devise more complex bailout
policies (e.g. with repayments or limited to the last failing firm) or to consider a
more complex competitive setup (e.g. introducing asymmetries or a richer menu
of contracts). Another possible extension would be to embed a genuine banking
model within our framework. For instance one could endogenise portfolio choice
and model an interbank (wholesale) market. Or one could examine whether the
traditional result that bailout guarantees typically induce banks to take exces-
sive risk would still hold in an environment where excessive risk-taking may be
mitigated by coordinated behaviour (since higher profits may reduce moral
hazard).
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the critical discount factors
A.1.1 No systematic bailout guarantees
We start by deriving the expected profit from coordinated behaviour (LHS of the
ICC). In each period t, a bank gets profits from coordinated behaviour δt π
M
2 with
probability p1ðtÞ; monopoly profits δtπM with probability p2ðtÞ; and 0 with
probability p3ðtÞ. The respective probabilities can be written as follows:28
28 Notably the probability of the competitor being in the market in period t can be computed as
pt1. The fact that the competitor might have to leave the market in period t does not affect the
profits of the other bank in period t.
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p1ðtÞ ¼ ptðpt1Þ ¼ p2t1
p2ðtÞ ¼ pt 1 pð Þ þ p 1 pð Þ þ p2 1 pð Þ þ . . .þ pt2 1 pð Þ

 
¼ pt 1 pð Þ 1 p
t1
1 p ¼ p
t 1 pt1 
p3ðtÞ ¼ 1 p2t1  pt 1 pt1
  ¼ 1 pt:
This yields
LHS ¼
X1
t¼1
δt1 p2t1
πM
2
þ ptð1 pt1ÞπM
 
¼ p
2 1 δp2ð Þ þ
p
1 δp
p
1 δp2
 
πM ¼ p
1 δp
p
2 1 δp2ð Þ
 
πM :
Next, we turn to the right-hand side of ICC, i.e. the immediate deviation profit
(obtained with probability p since the shock occurs after the interest rate
decision) plus the expected punishment stream from the following period
onwards. The former profit is simply pπM . As for the latter, there are four
possible events at each time t  2:
1. Both banks are in the market at the beginning of the period, and
the deviating bank has a positive shock in that period: p4ðtÞ ¼ p2ðt1Þ  p:
2. Both banks are in the market at the beginning of the period, and the
deviating bank has a negative shock in that period: p5ðtÞ ¼ p2ðt1Þ  ð1 pÞ:
3. The deviating bank will be in the market at time t  2 and earn monopoly
profit alone:
p6ðtÞ ¼ pt ð1 pÞ þ pð1 pÞ þ p2ð1 pÞ þ . . .þ pt2ð1 pÞ

 
¼ ptð1 pÞ 1 p
t1
1 p ¼ p
tð1 pt1Þ:
4. The deviating bank will not be in the market: p7ðtÞ ¼ 1 p2ðt1Þ  ptð1 pt1Þ.
However, it is only p6ðtÞ that is associated with a non-zero payoff (p4ðtÞ
and p5ðtÞ are associated with πC ¼ 0 and p7ðtÞ to previous exit). Thus, adding
over t:
RHS ¼ pπM þ
X1
t¼2
δt1ptð1 pt1ÞπM ¼ pπM þ δp
2
1 δp π
M  δp
3
1 δp2 π
M :
Systematic Bailout Guarantees and Tacit Coordination 23
Brought to you by | University of East Anglia
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/17 3:56 PM
Constructing the overall ICC by comparing LHS against RHS (i.e. eq. [2]), solving
for δ and noticing that πM falls through, one gets that tacit coordination is
sustainable if:
1
1 δp
1
2ð1 δp2Þ
 
pπM|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
expected profit of coordination
 1þ δp
1 δp
δp2
1 δp2
 
pπM|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
expected profit of deviation
i:e δ  1
2p2
:
A.1.2 Systematic bailout guarantees
With systematic bailout guarantees a bank that has received a negative shock is
rescued and allowed to operate in the following period. There is no profit (nor
actual loss) in the period of failure. Setting up the ICC and solving for the critical
discount factor, we obtain the traditional supergame result in a symmetric price-
setting duopoly. Coordination is sustainable if:
p
X
t¼1
δt1
πM
2
þ ð1 pÞ
X
t¼1
δt1  0|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
expected profit of coordination
 pπM þ ð1 pÞ  0þ p
X
t¼2
δt1  πC|{z}
¼0
þð1 pÞ
X
t¼2
δt1  0
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
expected profit of deviation
i:e: δ  1
2
:
A.2 Derivation of the consumer welfare equations
A.2.1 No systematic bailout guarantees
Under coordination (δ  12p2): From a consumer welfare perspective, there are
six possible states at time t: (I) there is a duopoly, banks coordinate their
behaviour, and the deposits are returned with interest by both banks; (II) there
is a duopoly, banks coordinate their behaviour, and all deposits are lost because
of the negative shocks to both duopolists; (III) there is a duopoly, banks
coordinate their behaviour, and only one bank receives a negative shock; (IV)
there is a monopoly and the deposits are returned with interest; (V) there is a
monopoly and the deposits are lost because of a negative shock; (VI) there is no
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market at all (banks have exited and consumer welfare is nil). The respective
probabilities are
pIðtÞ ¼ p2t
pIIðtÞ ¼ p2 t1ð Þ 1 pð Þ2
pIIIðtÞ ¼ 2 p2 t1ð Þp 1 pð Þ
 
¼ 2 p2 t1ð Þ 1 pð Þ
 
pIVðtÞ ¼ 2  pt1 1 pð Þ þ p 1 pð Þ þ p2 1 pð Þ þ . . .þ pt2 1 pð Þ
 
   p ¼ 2pt 1 pt1 
pVðtÞ ¼ 2  pt1 1 pð Þ þ p 1 pð Þ þ . . .þ pt2 1 pð Þ
 
   1 pð Þ ¼ 2pt1 1 pð Þ 1 pt1 
pVIðtÞ ¼ 1 pI tð Þ þ pII tð Þ þ pIII tð Þ þ pIV tð Þ þ pV tð Þð Þ:
The next step is to assign consumer welfare values to each state:
I : WC ¼ WM ¼ 12
RH
2
 2
II : ΦC2 ¼ RH2
III :
WM
2
þΦC1 ¼ 14
RH
2
 2
 RH
4
IV : WM ¼ 1
2
RH
2
 2
V : ΦC2 ¼ RH2
VI : 0:
Next, we simply sum up these welfare levels (adjusted by the probabilities) over
time, accounting for the discount factors. Notice that the sum of the losses is the
same as the total size of the NDIS and thus the expected present discounted
value of total taxes in the economy, which thus enter as negative terms (Φ<0):
EðWNBC Þ ¼
X1
t¼1
δt1 p2t WC þ p2ðt1Þð1 pÞ2 ΦC2 þ 2 p2t1ð1 pÞ
   WC
2
þΦC1
  
þ
þ
X1
t¼1
δt1 2ptð1 pt1Þ WM þ 2pt1ð1 pÞð1 pt1Þ ΦC2
 
¼ RH=2
1 δp2 ð1 pÞ 
p
4
RH
h i
þ RH=2
1 δp
p
2
RH  2ð1 pÞ
h i
:
Under no coordination (δ< 12p2): From a consumer welfare perspective, there
are again six possible states at time t: (I) there is a competitive duopoly and the
deposits are returned with interest by both banks; (II) there is a competitive
duopoly and all deposits are lost because of the negative shocks to both duopo-
lists; (III) there is a competitive duopoly and only one bank receives a negative
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shock; (IV) there is a monopoly and the deposits are returned with interest; (V)
there is a monopoly and the deposits are lost because of a negative shock; (VI)
there is no market at all (banks have exited and consumer welfare is nil). These
events occur, respectively, with the same probabilities pIðtÞ through pVIðtÞ that
we discussed above; it is just that “duopoly, banks coordinate their behaviour”
has to be replaced with “competitive duopoly”. However, the welfare levels
associated with each state are different:
I : WCNC ¼
R2H
2
II : ΦNC2 ¼ RH
III :
WCNC
2
þΦNC1 ¼ R
2
H
4
 RH
2
IV : WM ¼ 1
2
RH
2
 2
V : ΦC2 ¼ RH2
VI : 0:
We sum again these probability-adjusted welfare levels over time, to obtain:
EðWNBNC Þ ¼
X1
t¼1
δt1 p2t WCNC þ p2ðt1Þð1 pÞ2 ΦNC2 þ 2 p2t1ð1 pÞ
   WCNC
2
þΦNC1
  
þ
X1
t¼1
δt1 2pt 1 pt1  WM þ 2pt1ð1 pÞ 1 pt1  ΦC2 
¼ RH=2
1 δp2
p
2
RH
 
þ RH=2
1 δp
p
2
RH  2 1 pð Þ
h i
:
A.2.2 Systematic bailout guarantees
We proceed in the same fashion as before. However, here, banks never exit.
When consumers’ deposits are lost due to the negative shocks, the Government
refunds them the original capital, as well as paying the bailout costs γ.
Under coordination (δ  12): There are three scenarios that can charac-
terise the economy at any period t: (I) both banks have a positive shock
and return deposits with interest (which occurs with probability p^IðtÞ ¼ p2);
(II) only one bank receives a negative shock (probability p^IIðtÞ ¼ 2pð1 pÞ);
(III) both banks receive a negative shock ( p^IIIðtÞ ¼ ð1 pÞ2). This is
true every period, and each state is associated with the following welfare
levels:
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I : WM ¼ 1
2
RH
2
 2
II :
WM
2
þΦC1  γ ¼ 14
RH
2
 2
 RH
4
 γ
III : ΦC2  2γ ¼ RH2  2γ:
We can therefore sum this stream of expected payoffs and then subtract the
present discounted value of the total tax bill (NDIS and rescue costs):
EðWBC Þ ¼
X12
t¼1
δt1fp2WM þ 2pð1 pÞ W
M
2
þΦC1  γ
 
þ ð1 pÞ2 ΦC2  2γð Þg
¼ RH=2
1 δ
p
4
RH þ p 1
h i
 2ð1 pÞγ
1 δ :
Under no coordination (δ< 12): We proceed exactly as in the case of coordina-
tion. The probabilities are the same as those derived above, but the associated
welfare levels are different:
I : WCNC ¼
R2H
2
II :
WCNC
2
þΦNC1  γ ¼ R
2
H
4
 R
2
H
2
 γ
III : ΦNC2  2γ ¼ RH  2γ:
Summing up over time:
EðWBNCÞ ¼
X1
t¼1
δt1 p2WCNC þ 2pð1 pÞ
WCNC
2
þΦNC1  γ
 
þ ð1 pÞ2 ΦNC2  2γð Þ
 
¼ RH=2
1 δ pRH  2ð1 pÞ½  
2ð1 pÞγ
1 δ :
A.3 On the direct bailout costs
In this section we show the non-negativity of γ^NC and γ^C. As for the threshold γ^NC:
γ^NC ¼ 1 δ2ð1 pÞ
RH=2
1 δ ½pRH  2ð1 pÞ 
RH=2
1 δp2
p
2
RH
h i
 RH=2
1 δp
p
2
RH  2ð1 pÞ
h i 
 0
or
pRH
1
1 δ
1=2
1 δp2 
1=2
1 δp
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
þ 2ð1 pÞ  1
1 δþ
1
1 δp
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
< 0
 0:
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It can be shown that the first term is larger in absolute terms. As a result the
threshold is positive. To see this remember (Condition 1) that RH > 4
1p
p .
Consequently we have that pRH > 2ð1 pÞ. Further notice that
1
1 δ
1=2
1 δp2 
1=2
1 δp >  
1
1 δþ
1
1 δp
 
which gives us the result that γ^NC is positive. As for the threshold γ^C:
γ^C ¼ 1 δ2ð1 pÞ
RH=2
1 δ

p
4
RH  ð1 pÞ

 RH=2
1 δp2

ð1 pÞ  p
4
RH

 RH=2
1 δp

p
2
RH  2ð1 pÞ
 
 0
or
p
4
RH
1
1 δþ
1
1 δp2 
1
1 δp
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
þð1 pÞ  1
1 δ
1
1 δp2 þ
2
1 δp
 
 0:
For the same argument as before we have p4RH > ð1 pÞ. Moreover
1
1 δþ
1
1 δp2 
1
1 δp >  
1
1 δ
1
1 δp2 þ
2
1 δp
 
which is true since δp< 1, hence γ^C is positive.
A.4 Proof of (i) in Proposition 2
We show that:
EðWBC Þ ¼
RH=2
1 δ

p
4
RH þ p 1

 2ð1 pÞγ
1 δ <
EðWNBNC Þ ¼
RH=2
1 δp2

p
2
RH

þ RH=2
1 δp

p
2
RH  2ð1 pÞ

or
p
4
RH  ð1 pÞ< 1 δ1 δp2

p
2
RH

þ 1 δ
1 δp

p
2
RH  2ð1 pÞ

: ½14
Note that RHS of inequality [14] is continuous and decreasing in δ if
p
4RH þ p 1 > 0, which holds by assumption. To see this take the derivatives:
@
@δ
1 δ
1 δp2
 
¼ ð1 δp
2Þ þ ð1 δÞp2
ð1 δp2Þ2 ¼
p2  1
ð1 δp2Þ2 <0
@
@δ
1 δ
1 δp
 
¼ ð1 δpÞ þ ð1 δÞpð1 δpÞ2 ¼
p2  1
ð1 δpÞ2 <0:
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Yielding:
@RHS
@δ
¼ p
2  1
ð1 δp2Þ2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
< 0

p
2
RH

|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
þ p 1ð1 δpÞ2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
<0

p
2
RH þ 2p 2

|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
<0:
Consequently the RHS of eq. [14] is smallest for the largest value of δ in the given
range, which is δNB ¼ 12p2. Furthermore, note that inequality [14] holds for RH
close to its minimum permissible value from Condition 1: RH > 4
1p
p .
Next, the LHS and RHS of inequality [14] are continuous and increasing in
RH . Given,
1 δ
1 δp2 <
1 δ
1 δp
the RHS of inequality [14] is guaranteed to increase faster in RH than the LHS if:
p
4
RH  ð1 pÞ< 1 δ
NB
1 δNBp2
p
2
RH
h i
þ 2 1 δ
NB
1 δNBp2
p
4
RH  ð1 pÞ
h i
;
which is guaranteed to hold if:
1
4
<
1 12p2
1 12p2 p2
, p > 2ﬃﬃ
7
p :
As a result, inequality [14] is guaranteed to hold for all permissible values of RH
if the probability of a positive shock is sufficiently high. We thus reach the result
stated in Proposition 2(i): EðWBC Þ<EðWNBNC Þ ;" p 2 ð 2ﬃﬃ7p ; 1Þ ^ 12  δ< 12p2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is proven in Section A.5.1 and part (ii) in Section A.5.2.
A.5.1 Different trigger strategies
From the modified ICCs we can derive δBðTÞ:
p
X1
t¼1
δt1
πM
2
 pπM þ p
XTþ1
t¼2
δt1  0þ
X1
t¼Tþ2
δtþ1
πM
2
 !
δBðTÞ solves 1 δ
Tþ1
1 δ ¼ 2
½15
and δNBðTÞ:
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X1
t¼1
δt1 p2t1
πM
2
þ ptð1 pt1ÞπMÞ  pπM þ
X1
t¼2
δt1ðptð1 pt1ÞπM þ p2t1 π
M
2
 !
δNBðTÞ solves 1 ðδp
2ÞTþ1
1 δp2 ¼ 2:
½16
It can be proven in three steps that dðδ
NBðTÞδBðTÞÞ
dT <0.
Step 1: Using the implicit function theorem:
dδBðTÞ
dT
¼ ðδp
2ÞlnðδÞ
Tð1 δÞ  1þ δT ½17
and
dδNBðTÞ
dT
¼ ðδp
2Þ lnðδp2Þ
Tð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞT : ½18
Given the conjecture that δp2 > 12 and, hence, lnðδp2Þ >  12, we have that
dδBðTÞ
dT <0 and
dδNBðTÞ
dT <0. This is because the nominators of eqs [17] and [18] are
negative, and the denominators are positive. The former is immediate, and the
latter is proven below. As a result, the conjecture that δp2 > 12 holds is confirmed
because δNBðTÞ > 12p2 " T 2 ½1;1Þ. The proof that the denominators of eqs [17]
and [18] are positive follows from a continuity argument. First, notice that:
ðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞTÞjT¼1 ¼ 2þ δp2 þ ðδp2Þ1 > 0 since 0< δp2 < 1:
Second:
dðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞTÞ
dT
¼ 1þ δp2  ðδp2ÞT lnðδp2Þ > 0
because:
dð1þ δp2  ðδp2ÞT lnðδp2ÞÞ
dT
¼ ðδp2ÞTðlnðδp2ÞÞ2 > 0
and:
ð1þ δp2  ðδp2ÞT lnðδp2ÞÞjT¼1 ¼ 1þ δp2  ðδp2Þ1 lnðδp2Þ > 0 "
1
2
 δp2 < 1
since:
ð1þ δp2  ðδp2Þ1 lnðδp2ÞÞ

ðδp2Þ!12
> 0
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ð1þ δp2  ðδp2Þ1 lnðδp2ÞÞjðδp2Þ!1 ¼ 0
dð1þ δp2  ðδp2Þ1 lnðδp2ÞÞ
dðδp2Þ ¼ 1
1 lnðδp2Þ
ðδp2Þ2 <0:
Hence, by continuity ð1þ δp2  ðδp2Þ1 lnðδp2ÞÞ > 0 " 12  δp2 < 1. As a result,
ðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞTÞ > 0 " T 2 ½1;1Þ.
Step 2:
d dδ
NBðTÞ
dT
dp
¼ 2δp lnðδp
2ÞðT  1þ 2ðδp2ÞTÞ þ ðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞTÞ
ðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ ðδp2ÞTÞ2
> 0
½19
given that δp2 < 1 and, hence, lnðδp2Þ<0. This is because ðTð1 δp2Þ  1þ
ðδp2ÞTÞ > 0 " T 2 ½1;1Þ, which was proven in Step 1.
Step 3: Notice that δBðTÞ is only a special case of δNBðTÞ, i.e.
lim p!1δNBðTÞ ¼ δBðTÞ. As a result:
dðδNBðTÞ  δBðTÞÞ
dT
<0 ½20
because of eq. [19]. In other words, the intermediate range of discount factors where
our result arises increases if the length of the punishment phase (T) is reduced.
A.5.2 Different interest rates on deposits under coordinated behaviour
Consider an interest rate under coordinated behaviour on deposits that is higher
than the monopoly interest rate and that leads to lower, but positive, joint
profits πM;ðRH2  εÞðRH2 þ εÞ ¼ πM  ε2, where πM > ε2 > 0. Let the corresponding
critical discount factors be denoted by δBðεÞ and δNBðεÞ. From the modified ICCs
we can derive δBðεÞ:
p
X1
t¼1
δt1
πM
2
 pπM ) δBðεÞ ¼ 1
2
þ ε
2
2πM
½21
and δNBðεÞ:
X1
t¼1
δt1ðp2t1 π
M

2
þ ptð1 pt1ÞπMÞ  pπM þ
X1
t¼2
δt1ðptð1 pt1ÞπMÞ
) δNBðεÞ ¼ 1
2p2
þ ε
2
2πM
 1
p2
:
½22
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Hence, dðδ
NBðεÞδBðεÞÞ
dε > 0 because p< 1. Further, δ
NBðεÞ< 1 if ε2 < ð2p2  1ÞπM ¼
ð2p2  1ÞðRH2 Þ2.
A.6 Stochastic bailouts
The critical discount factor can be derived following the same steps as in
Appendix A.1. Let p^; pþ ð1 pÞq denote a bank’s probability of continuation.
We have
p1ðtÞ ¼ p^t1pðp^t1Þ ¼ p^2t2p
p2ðtÞ ¼ p^t1p ð1 p^Þ þ p^ 1 p^ð Þ þ p^2 1 p^ð Þ þ . . .þ p^t2 þ 1 p^ð Þ
h i
¼ p^t1p 1 p^t1
 
LHS ¼
X1
t¼1
δt1 p^2t2p
πM
2
þ p^t1pð1 p^t1ÞπM
 
¼ p
1 δp^
p
2ð1 δp^2Þ
 !
πM
and
p6ðtÞ ¼ p^t1p ð1 p^Þ þ p^ð1 p^Þ þ p^2ð1 p^Þ þ :::þ p^t2ð1 p^Þ
h i
¼ p^t1pð1 p^t1Þ
RHS ¼ pπM þ
X1
t¼2
δt1 p^t1pð1 p^t1Þ πM ¼ pþ pδp^
1 δp^
pδp^2
ð1 δp^2Þ
 
πM :
The critical discount factor can be computed as δBðqÞ ¼ 1
2p^2
¼ 1
2ðpþð1pÞqÞ2.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
We prove part (a) and part (b) of Proposition 4 in turn. The proof of part (a)
consists of three steps.
Step 1: As explained in Section 5.3 some of the probabilities and consumer
welfare levels associated with the different events from Appendix A.1 and A.2 need
to be modified for a non-banking industry setting. We now have p1ðtÞ ¼ p2t,
p2ðtÞ ¼ ptð1 ptÞ, p3ðtÞ ¼ 1 pt, p4ðtÞ ¼ p2ðt1Þp, p5ðtÞ ¼ p2ðt1Þð1 pÞ,
p6ðtÞ ¼ ptð1 ptÞ, p7ðtÞ ¼ 1 p2ðt1Þ  ptð1 ptÞ. An examination of the ICCs
shows that δNB ¼ 12p2 while δB ¼ 12 and, hence, the result of Proposition 1 prevails
in a more general industry setting with a downward-sloping demand curve.
Step 2: Consumer welfare levels without bailouts under coordination and no
coordination are, respectively, given by:
State I ðw: prob: pIðtÞÞ : WC ¼ 12
RH
2
 2
and WCNC ¼
R2H
2
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State II ðw: prob: pIIðtÞÞ : ΦC2 ¼ ΦNC2 ¼ 0
State III ðw: prob: pIIIðtÞÞ : WM þΦC1 ¼ 12
RH
2
 2
and WCNC þΦNC1 ¼
R2H
2
State V ðw: prob: pVðtÞÞ : ΦC2 ¼ 0
and with systematic bailout guarantees:
State II ðw: prob: p^IIðtÞÞ : WM þΦC1  γ ¼ 12
RH
2
 2
 γ and WCNC þΦNC1  γ ¼
R2H
2
 γ
State III ðw: prob: p^IIIðtÞÞ : ΦC2  2γ ¼ ΦNC2  2γ ¼ 2γ:
Furthermore, we can derive
EðWBC Þ ¼
1
2
RH
2
 2 2p p2
1 δ 
2ð1 pÞ
1 δ γ
EðWNBNC Þ ¼
3ð2p p2Þ
1 δp2 þ
2p
1 δp
p2
1 δp2
 
1
2
RH
2
 2
:
Step 3: For γ ¼ 0, EðWBC Þ< EðWNBNC Þ holds if:
2p p2
1 δ < 3
2p p2
1 δp2 þ
2p
1 δp
p2
1 δp2 : ½23
A simple sufficient condition for inequality [23] to hold is that p > p0 ¼ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
3=5
p  0:77. Hence, the result of Proposition 2 prevails in a more general
industry setting with a downward-sloping demand curve if the probability of a
negative shock is not too high. This concludes the proof of part (a).
The proof of part (b) of Proposition 4 consists of two steps:
Step 1: The total welfare levels (TW) associated with the different events
from Appendix A.1 and A.2 without bailouts are under coordination and no
coordination, respectively, given by:
State I ðw prob: pIðtÞÞ : TWC ¼ 32
RH
2
 2
and TWCNC ¼
R2H
2
State III ðw prob: pIIIðtÞÞ : TWC ¼ 32
RH
2
 2
and TWCNC ¼
R2H
2
State IV ðw prob: pIVðtÞÞ : TWM ¼ 32
RH
2
 2
and TWM ¼ 3
2
RH
2
 2
and with systematic bailout guarantees:
State I ðw prob: p^IðtÞÞ : TWC ¼ 32
RH
2
 2
and TWCNC ¼
R2H
2
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State II ðw prob: p^IIðtÞÞ : TWC  γ ¼ 32
RH
2
 2
 γ and TWCNC  γ ¼
R2H
2
 γ
State III ðw prob: p^IIIðtÞÞ : ΦC2  2γ ¼ ΦNC2  2γ ¼ 2γ:
We can derive
EðTWBC Þ ¼
3
2
RH
2
 2 2p p2
1 δ 
2ð1 pÞ
1 δ γ
EðWNBNC Þ ¼
4
3 p
2
1 δpþ
2
3p
1 δp2 
2p
1 δp
 
3
2
RH
2
 2
:
Step 2: For γ ¼ 0, EðWBC Þ<EðWNBNC Þ holds if:
2p p2
1 δ <
1
3
2p
1 δp2 
p2
1 δp
 
þ 2p p
2
1 δp ; ½24
Notice that the derivative of the left-hand side of inequality [24] with respect to δ
is positive and larger than the derivative of the right-hand side of inequality [24]
with respect to δ, whenever inequality [24] holds. As a result, inequality [24] is
guaranteed to hold if:
2p p2
1 δNB <
1
3
2p
1 δNBp2 
p2
1 δNBp
 
þ 2p p
2
1 δNBp ; ½25
or
6p 3p2
1 12p2
<
6p 4p2
1 12p
þ 4p: ½26
The above inequality holds for p! 1. Furthermore, there exists a lower bound
p0 > p such that inequality [26] holds for all p 2 ðp0; 1. Hence, the result of
Proposition 2 prevails in a more general industry setting for both the consumer
welfare and the total welfare standard, provided the probability of a negative
shock is not too high. A sufficient condition is given by p > p00  0:87. This
concludes the proof of part (b).
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